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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 07/02/2008

Accident number: 555

Accident time: 07:28

Accident Date: 29/05/2006

Where it occurred: Southern runway,
Bagram Air Field
(BAP), A4 and 6 mine
line
Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 05/06/2006

ID original source: OPS-27/28/06

Name of source: UNMACA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: dry/dusty
grass/grazing area
rocks/stones
Date last modified: 07/02/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 3

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
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Accident report
The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion to
a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the
report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text
in [ ] is editorial. The report is “internal”. The country MAC did not make an investigation,
presumably for security reasons.

Cover letter
File: OPS-27/28/06
From: Chief of Operations/DPM, UNMACA
To: Area Manager UNAMAC Kabul
Date: 07 June 06
Subject: Demining Accident Investigation Report
Attached please find the investigation report along with its supporting documents and photos
of the demining accident happened on [the Victim] deminer of team M [International demining
company] on 29 May 06 at 0728 hours in Bagram Air Field (BAF).
AMAC received the initial report of the accident by email at the following day of the accident
happened in [International demining company] standard format. While we entered the report
in IMSMA as demining accident with ID-80, some information was missing. Therefore, we
asked [International demining company] to provide us the report using standard format for
demining accident issued by MACA MIS section.
The investigation of this accident has been conducted by [International demining company]
and BAF MAC, while AMAC does not have permission to get into BAF. Therefore, we did not
take action for the investigation of this accident.
The findings and recommendations are mentioned in the report, forwarded for your info and
further action.

05/06/2006 Commercial-in-Confidence FINAL REPORT
CII BAFSR 29/05/2006
FINAL INCIDENT REPORT
BAF SOUTHERN RUNWAY, BAGRAM
MINE STRIKE

1 INTRODUCTION
During demining operations, a mine was involuntarily detonated in a mine line in the vicinity of
Alpha 4 and Alpha 6 at approximately 7.28am.
One deminer was involved and sustained injuries: the deminer was immediately taken to
Camp Lacey US military hospital.
All relevant authorities were notified.
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An interim report was submitted within 24hrs after the event. This document will identify the
findings.

2 MAIN BODY OF REPORT
2.1 Factual data
2.1.1 Date and time of Incident: 29th May 2006. 07.28 am
2.1.2 Location: Bagram Air Field (BAP), Alpha 4 and Alpha 6 mine line.
2.1.3 Witnesses/people present:
[the Victim]: Injured deminer
[Name removed] Partner: PRESENT at SCENE
[Name removed] Section Leader: IN CLOSE PROXIMITY
[Name removed] Team leader: IN CLOSE PROXIMITY
[Name removed] Supervisor: AT CP
[Name removed] Supervisor: AT CP
[Name removed] Medic: IN CLOSE PROXIMITY
[Name removed] Health & Safety Officer: AT CP
[Name removed] International Field Manager: AT CP
Statements are attached.
2.1.4 Client: [Name removed]. End User —USACE/USAF
2.1.5 Injuries
[Name and ID number removed]
Right middle finger: deep lacerations, possible extensor tendon rupture.
Right tibia/fibula area multiple abrasions and lacerations
Eyes: minor particles from blast damage to cornea (minor)
2.1.6 Property Damage: None
2.1.7 Organisations and people notified or involved.
USACE Bagram: BAF MAC: UNMACA.
CII Project Manager: CII [Name removed]
[International demining company] head Office:
2.1.8 Other relevant information
Responsible device was suspected to as being a PMN located in a 2nd mine line.
Detonation of a 1st mine line was carried out on 26th May 2006 by US EOD. 2 are known not
to have exploded and were left- none of these 2 mines were part of the incident.
Work was suspended immediately.
[The accident site is indicated below. The arrow indicates the site of the initiation, which would
have been well within reach of a deminer kneeling at the base-stick.]
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2.2 Investigations
[Name removed] (USACE), [Name removed] (BAF MAC), [Name removed], (CII VMS), [Name
removed] ([International demining company] EOD field manager), met at the Control Point at
approximately 8.30am, 29th May 2006 to try and ascertain the facts.
Discussions were immediately held with regard to possible reasons for the accident; the initial
discussions between the above parties concluded at that time that the accident was likely to
be due to increased sensitivity of the PMNs as a result of deterioration through age and the
demolitions carried out the previous Friday.
It was agreed that operations be immediately suspended and the remainder of the day would
be spent on re-training; operations were to resume on the 30th May 2006.
The MAC informed the team that due to the current sensitivity of the mine line, they would
provide a mechanical roller and flail to clear the line.
[Name removed] ([International demining company] health & Safety manager), and [Name
removed] ([International demining company] Programme Manager) visited the site
immediately upon being notified of the incident but were too late to join the above
investigation.
The injured deminer was visited at the hospital and his condition was stable; he was awaiting
surgery.
A visit to the site was made and photographs were taken.
All staff were instructed to provide statements.
The Deminers' PPE and visor was brought back to Kabul and photographed.
The PPE is not damaged internally and is intact in line with reports from the initial
investigation. The visor shows significant soot and blackening on the outside of the visor,
consistent with the visor being worn correctly and in the down position.
2.3 Corrective Action
Operations were immediately suspended and re-training initiated.
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BAF MAC informed [International demining company] that due to the potential sensitivity of
the PMN mines, they would run a mechanical roller and flail through the line.

3. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the evidence obtained and statements taken, this incident report concludes with the
following series of events:
•

Deminers were working in clearance lane as part of re-check; BAF EOD had carried
out detonations on 26th May.

•

After rotating deminers, [Name removed] watched his partner [the Victim] who he
believed had detected a signal.

•

[The Victim] states he was collecting soil with his trowel at this time.

•

A mine detonated out of the lane, around 20cm North East from the deminers
clearing position.

•

No mine frog was found.

•

Medic was called and operations stopped

•

Section leader shouted to deminer who responded although it is unlikely he was
in full comprehension as he believed himself to be unconscious in his statement.

•

The section leader administered immediate first aid and helped him to a safe area;
deminer was walking.

•

The medic arrived within 4 minutes and applied further emergency first aid prior to
taking him to the hospital.

•

Relevant parties were notified.

The mine does NOT appear to have been within the deminer’s lane or to the right of his
operating position and so the conclusion is that this was not activated by touch.
The PMN is activated by a cock-strike principle; excessive vibrations will cause this mine to
activate.
Two factors are likely to be responsible for its increased sensitivity and resulting detonation:
•

Age deterioration- buried for approximately 12 years in harsh climates.

•

Detonation of other mines within close proximity — controlled detonation by BAF
EOD 26th May 2006.

Four issues are noted only:
1. The wearing of good quality PPE and adherence to procedures has prevented
serious injury or even fatality.
2. Following the in-situ demolitions carried out by BAF EOD specialists, the 2 mines
that failed to detonate were not clearly identified.
3. The response of the teams, medics, and subsequent treatment was a key
component to minimising the deminers trauma.
4. In line with [International demining company] SOPs, PMN mines are no-touch
items and must be disposed of in-situ.
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4 PREVENTATIVE ACTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
All procedures were strictly followed hence the minimal injuries sustained.
The investigation concludes with the following preventive action and recommendations:
1. Discussions should be held between BAF MAC, BAF EOD., and [International demining
company] with regard to further in-situ demolitions when required.
2. Where demolitions are to be carried out in situ by BAF EOD, any mines that have failed to
detonate must be clearly identified by BAF EOD and marked with a 25m safety distance by
[International demining company]. An agreement should be sought between USMAC, BAF
EOD and [International demining company] of how best to dispose of items that have failed to
detonate.
3. Periodic practice emergency drills are to be strictly continued.
4. The correct and constant use of PPE in all areas is once again to be emphasized as the
injuries in this case are mitigated to a large extent by the correct usage of PPE.

Prepared by [Name removed], [International demining company] Programme Manager
Copied to: [Military, Commercial demining agency and UNMACA AMAC]

INCIDENT REPORT FORM dated 1st April 2005 [Sic]
REFERENCE: AFG1011051106
Date of Incident: 29 MAY 2006
Time of incident: 07:28
At approximately 0728 29 May 2006 a demining accident occurred in the North Western area
of A6 mine line. A suspected PMN detonated resulting in injuries to [the Victim], who
sustained lacerations to his right lower leg, badly injured 3rd finger, lacerations to his right
arm/shoulder and facial/eye injury from the blast.
Injuries:
RIGHT MIDDLE FINGER: DEEP LACERATIONS, POSSIBLE EXTENSOR TENDON
RUPTURE. RIGHT TIBIA/FIBULA AREA MULTIPLE ABRASIONS AND LACERATIONS
EYES: MINOR PARTICLES
FROM BLAST DAMAGE TO CORNEA (MINOR)
Serious, stable, non-life threatening
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Victim Report
Victim number: 730

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 16 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
minor Face
minor Shoulder
severe Arm
severe Eyes
severe Leg
COMMENT: See Medical report.

Medical report
[From internal reports (not medical personnel).]
Right middle finger: deep lacerations, possible extensor tendon rupture.
Right tibia/fibula area multiple abrasions and lacerations
Eyes: minor particles from blast damage to cornea (minor)
[The Victim] “sustained lacerations to his right lower leg, badly injured 3rd finger, lacerations
to his right arm/shoulder and facial/eye injury from the blast.”
“Injuries:
“RIGHT MIDDLE FINGER: DEEP LACERATIONS, POSSIBLE EXTENSOR TENDON
RUPTURE. RIGHT TIBIA/FIBULA AREA MULTIPLE ABRASIONS AND LACERATIONS.
EYES: MINOR PARTICLES FROM BLAST DAMAGE TO CORNEA (MINOR). Serious,
stable, non-life threatening.

STATEMENTS
Statement 1: Supervisor
Date: 29/05/2006
Demining and BAC Clearance were going on normally according with plan.
As usual work Started at 6:30 I was on Admin area busy with paper work. My paper work was
finished. I was getting ready to go to the site.
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Suddenly incident happened on Team (M) after we stopped work. Me and [Name removed]
got to the point about 2 minutes by Ambulance which was parked at Admin Area. We saw that
in one of Team (M) lines. Team Leader of the Team [Name removed] and its Section Leader
[Name removed] Mine exploded on [the Victim] 350 Blood G. A+ Mine PMN. As the result of
explosion Deminer received injury on his right hand but seemed which the injury is on
external. I myself asked the Deminer his Blood Group and ID. He clearly answered me. We
evacuated the patient from the site we assisted with Medic did the first Aid.
The incident happened at 7:28/ 6 minutes first Aid been done on him and transferred to the
hospital around 10 minutes. [Name removed] (Medic), [Name removed] went to hospital with
patient. And I had the responsibility of the site. I out all personnel from the site and kept them
on Admin Area then I marked the incident point. I moved Deminers Demining kits from the
site and was carried to Admin Area by Section Leader when Mr. Darren was back from
hospital. A group of USA EOD, Contract; and other visitors visited the site we understand this
from their visit.
USA EOD on 26/05/06 exploded 10 mines on Mine field in this line. As the result of explosion
one meter in unlearned area two Mines were exploded. Which this mine is located between
those two Mines. It was very sensitive while excavation with a little bit touch explosions took
place
Because mine blow up (as gathered) which have made around Mines very sensitive finally?
Deminer was Demining according to SOP, who is healthy by god's grace.

Statement 2: Team Leader
[No date]
After I come to the site. Before Deminers got to the lines as usual I controlled the lines and
Section Leaders ordered the pairs to the lines. About one hour passed the pairs were busy in
all lines I controlled all pairs from the first up to the fifth. I was close to the fifth line about 40
meters far. Suddenly explosion happened reported to Medic by Section Leader. And
emergency first aid did by Section Leader before Medic arrive. The patient was evacuated
from site after first aid by Medics. Patient transferred to hospital by Ambulance.
Note: It is mentionable Mines were found and were blown up by EDD they were difficult and
dangerous completely to recheck the explosion point. The explosion on [the Victim] line is
located on the right side of the destruction point. In consequence EOD Team Explosion on
Friday all site Mines got dangerous.
More soil have been pried on them and got sensitive. Which the destruction cause Mine get
sensitive and dangerous. By smallest touch get explosion which explosion took place while
excavation today.

Statement 3: the Victim’s working partner
[No date]
I was looking him he detected his area Found the signal put Mine marker on the signal and
started work after few moment explosions happened.

Statement 4: Section Leader
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[No date]
15 minutes before I went to that line one meter left from previous explosion point. I told them
when you finish this Start your line from other side.
After few minutes I wanted to announce break but 2 minutes left for break time. I waited two
minutes. Then Explosion happened the first action I did I called Ambulance. And I walked
toward the person called him [the Victim’s name]. Are you fine answered yes I am fine then I
got to him — and picked him up I did the first aid and evacuated him to an open area.

Statement 5: Report of Mine Incident by safety officer
Date: 29/05/06
A mine incident happened on Team (M) field. As the result of the accident [the Victim]
Deminer I B.G ( 0+) received injury on his right arm, right hand , middle finger, right leg, and
external injury on other part of his body which is not critical.
The first aid accomplished after incident.
(Medic) [Name removed] with Ambulance arrived to the incident point and did the first aid.
After first aid the patient transferred to the hospital accompanied with me and a Supervisor.
I was with patient tip to the end of surgical operation and reporting to responsible persons.
Reason of Incident.
The incident happened on the time where the first Deminer changed and second Deminer
starts work.
The area that Deminer was working is the area which 13 mines found and exploded by
American EOD Team when Mines found and exploded by EOD Team. As the result of
explosion three Mines were exploded on unclear area as well.
On this area Mines have been found very deep. In different depth from 15 cm to 30cm as the
result of Ground badness some of them have changed their state.
The mentioned Deminer was working on the point where those three exploded Mines sprayed
dusts around after explosion.
This Mine is one of the Mines which other Mines blown up around it in unclear area. This
mine got sensitivity after the Mines explosion. When the Deminer is starting clearance of area
and soil his trowel touches to the Mine which cause Mines explosion and incident.
Cause of incident in light of safety and security issues.
Deminer was working. Regarding all safety and security issues. As it's cleared from injuries.
Deminer was dressed with PPE and visor we understood that part of visor has destroyed. And
PPE also harmed in some part
Suggested issues before incident.
For emphasizing to the issue.
Found Mines, UXO Should be reported to [Name removed], Contract QC officer, and MAC.
Reason for emphasizing. If the found Mines destroyed on time the site would more progress
beside that if the Mines exploded individually the opportunity would no be paved for dust
sprayed and wave. Supervisor investigation sheets and reports are also apart of statement.
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Statement 6: deminer
[No date]
After safety briefing we were walking to site. [Name removed] was my partner. First [Name
removed] stared work. Then he changed and I started work. We were working on the area
where already Mines blew up by American. The soil was soften. I was collecting the soil by
trowel and I progressed half meter a head. Suddenly explosion occurred.
The explosion occurred on the area where there already Mines were exploded. That is to say
that was explosion area. After explosion I become unconscious when I got conscious I was in
hospital. [Name removed] was in hospital with me and was looking after me up to end of the
operation.
While transferring me from the site [Name removed] and [Name removed] (Medic) were also
present. Before start work I ordered my PPE and visor and I entered to the area.
I feel lucky that — Mine exploded but I haven't injured so much. As far as l think this is
because of the PPE which protected me from Mines frag and wave.
About safety and securityAbout work and Mines we are being given information every day which is very useful for us.
And help us much while working.
At the end I any happy from all responsible persons. All helped me as much as they could.

Statement 7: Medic
[No date]
On 29/05/06 Monday 7:28am suddenly an incident happened on Bagram (012) site on Team
(M) [the Victim] (Deminer) Blood Group 0+ received injury on his right arm, right finger and
right leg.
Also in consequence of mines wave he has received extra injury on his face and eyes
[Commercial demining group] Ambulances arrived on incident point on time. I started first aid
and implemented A,B,C procedure around 4 minutes.
Health condition of Deminer was completely good not serious. Also he was conscious.
He was transferred to Bagram ISAF hospital in (10) minutes.
Note: first aid done:
1. injuries dressing
2. washing face with serum
3. Fluids using
4. Analgesics injection

Statement 8: Supervisor
Date: 29/05/06
As usual we left the compound at 4:45 and entered to check point 5:00 and at 5:40 search
finished and were got to the site 6:00 I briefed for personnel for 10 minutes I briefed all

10

personnel about what Demining procedures and safety brief was also done by [Name
removed] and then work as normal days at 7:28 me with were going to the site from Admin
area suddenly explosion occurred on Team ( M ) we were closed to Ambulance we got on the
Ambulance and moved to the incident point.
We arrived to the incident point after 2 minutes. At this time Team Leaders were ordered to
stop work and none of the personnel move from their place and the injured evacuated to the
cleared area by [Name removed] (Medic) and [Name removed] (Supervisor).
The first aid done very good in 6 minutes and I myself handed over the responsibility of the
site to [Name removed]. I went to hospital with injured.
The injured transferred to hospital in (10) minutes.
Totally took (16) minutes.
Our responsible [Name removed] arrived to the Hospital after (10) minutes.
After he visited the injured said to me, [Name removed] Medic and Ambulance stay here. We
go back to site. We got to the site.
And we had exchange of views with [Name removed], MAC, and 1SAF about sudden
explosion. Then we came to control point. visitors investigated from Team Leader, Section
Leader, and injured partner [Name removed] the investigation shows that as the result of
previous exploded mines in this line (10) mines in on line already found which were exploded
by ISAF EOD as the result of explosions shake on ground 5 extra mines were blown up in
distance of one meter.
This exploded mine was one of the unclear mines which was gotten sensitive and more dusts
sprayed on it as the result of ISAF EOD destruction by small touch causes explosion.
Regarding to site responsibility, experience and investigation we did.
Deminer was doing his job very good and used PPE and visor properly which cased to his
healthiness.

Analysis
It is remarkable that the only people who did not think that the deminer touched this mine with
his prodder were the demining company’s own internal investigators. The witnesses
(including the Victim and his partner) acknowledge that he touched the mine with his prodder,
but the investigators seemed determined to conclude that the mine had been made sensitive
by nearby demolitions and detonated spontaneously. While the PMN mechanism can be
decayed by corrosion of the central spring, this can only happen when the rubber top and
retaining “clip” has decayed to allow water to get in. There is no evidence of this having
happened elsewhere in Afghanistan. The mine involved in this accident may have been more
deeply concealed by ejecta from the earlier demolition but there is no reason to believe that it
was made more sensitive. (If the PMN could be reliably initiated by vibration as the
investigators claim, demining would be a lot easier.)
The Victim’s face and eye injuries are a clear indication that his visor was not worn properly.
The injuries to his right arm, right shoulder and right leg show that he was worked side-on to
the mine, rendering the frontal apron PPE ineffective. The hand injuries provide compelling
evidence that his hand was close to the mine, and prodded onto it. Deminers should work
with their body in-line with the area being explored.
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Reports on other accidents in this country at this time were conducted through the National
MA Authority and the above failings would all have been recognised by professional national
personnel.
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because it
is clear that the Demining company’s senior management sought to conceal what happened
in the accident and so avoid correcting glaring errors. It is likely that the Field supervisors did
not know that they were allowing errors to be made, so indicating inadequate training. The
secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” because that failing seems to apply to
senior ex-pat personnel as well as to Field supervisors and deminers.
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